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In September 2012 the European Commission opened a formal investigation of Gazprom’s 
business practices in the EU.1 The Gazprom investigation raises a number of questions. One 
of them is the issue of jurisdiction—whether EU competition law applies to Gazprom, a 
foreign company. A day after the opening of the proceeding, in a press note and alongside 
other issues, Gazprom raised the question of jurisdiction, noting that it complies with laws of 
the countries in which it operates and that is it ‘registered outside the jurisdiction of the EU’.2 
This statement, possibly, prompted some commentators to consider the applicability of EU 
law in this case. 
In a piece in the ECLR, entitled ‘Iron Curtain at the border: Gazprom and the Russian blocking 
order to prevent the extraterritoriality of EU competition law’, Sean Morris offered his views 
on some of the aspects of the Gazprom case, including the issue of jurisdiction.3 Morris 
discussed also the blocking Order issued by the Russian President4 in response to the 
European Commission’s investigation, and its possible effects in the Gazprom case. 
This article seeks to add a few important and relevant issues of law relating to 
extraterritoriality and the reach of EU law generally and in particular— in the context of the 
Gazprom investigation and in the light of the Morris article. This piece also sheds some light 
on the considerations which might have informed Russia’s hastily enactment of the blocking 
Order. 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law at Queen’s University Belfast. Comments are gratefully received at m.martyniszyn@qub.ac.uk. 
1 Three types of alleged anticompetitive practices are under investigation: usage of ‘no resale’ clauses in supply 
contracts; prevention of diversification of gas supplies; and imposition of unfair pricing by linking oil and gas 
prices in long-term contacts. European Commission, IP/12/937, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings 
Against Gazprom (4 September 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm. 
2 Gazprom, Gazprom Statement on Formal Stage of European Commission Antitrust Investigation (5 
September 2012), available at http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2012/september/article143314/. 
3 P Sean Morris, 'Iron Curtain at the border: Gazprom and the Russian blocking order to prevent the 
extraterritoriality of EU competition law', 35(12) European Competition Law Review 601 (2014). 
4 Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 on Measures to 
Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign Economic Activities [Указ Президента РФ 
от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285 "О мерах по защите интересов Российской Федерации при осуществлении 
российскими юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической деятельности"], (2012), available at 
http://text.document.kremlin.ru/document?id=70125938&byPara=1. For analysis and the English translation 
see Marek Martyniszyn, 'Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive 
Order', 37(1) World Competition 103 (2014). 
Extraterritoriality and the Effects Doctrine 
The discussion of extraterritoriality needs to start with the principle of territoriality, which is 
the most often invoked by states to assert jurisdiction. A state exercises jurisdiction upon its 
soil, its territory. It does not matter whether the entities involved are domestic or foreign.  
The terms ‘extraterritoriality’ or ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ are used interchangeably to 
describe a ‘competence of a State to make, apply and enforce rules of conduct in respect of 
persons, property or events beyond its territory’.5 Yet, there is no universally accepted 
definition of extraterritoriality. The term is often used to express different phenomena. In the 
competition law area, commentators often use it only in the context of cases involving 
reliance on the effects doctrine (discussed below), without being explicit about it. This can be 
confusing since other jurisdictional principles, such as objective territoriality, also allow 
asserting jurisdiction over persons and conduct outside state's territory.6 In many 
transnational cases jurisdiction can be asserted over foreign entities without recourse to the 
effects doctrine. 
Extraterritoriality requires a link, a sufficient connection between the state and the person, 
conduct, or property outside its territory. In many cases this link is territorial. The objective 
territoriality principle, formulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Lotus, a 
case decided in 1927, allows a state to assert jurisdiction where only part of the offence—one 
of its constituent elements—have been committed within its territory.7 In the context of a 
competition law case against foreign entities this means that if some of the challenged 
anticompetitive conduct took place in the territory of a state, that state can assert jurisdiction 
over the conduct and entities involved, even if they are foreign. Moreover, by piercing the 
corporate veil, the harmed jurisdiction may reach for a foreign parent company by 
contributing to it conduct of its local subsidiaries. 
The principle of objective territoriality helps to pursue many transnational violations, yet it 
does not allow to address all of them. In particular, it is of no help in cases involving only 
foreign anticompetitive conduct of foreign entities, even if the consequences of that conduct 
(that is, the competitive harm) affect the domestic market. In this context, the United States 
was the first jurisdiction which went further and departed from what were then the well-
recognized jurisdictional principles. Already in 1945, in Alcoa,8 a US federal court, hearing an 
appeal in lieu of the Supreme Court, formulated a new jurisdictional principle—the effects 
                                                          
5 Menno T. Kamminga, 'Extraterritoriality' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, online ed. (OUP, 2010). 
6 The principle of objective territoriality is particularly useful in competition law. Other principles allowing for 
extraterritoriality include the principles of nationality, passive personality, security and universality. In this vein, 
for example, Robert Y. Jennings, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws', 33 British 
Yearbook of International Law 146 (1957), at 153. 
7 ‘Offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are 
nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent 
elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there’ France v. Turkey, Ser. A., No. 
10, 23 (PCIJ 1927). 
8 United States v. Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
doctrine. In essence, this principle provides that a state may apply its competition law to 
foreign persons in relation to their foreign conduct, if that conduct has harmful effects within 
the state’s borders. Hence, under the effects doctrine the suffered harm serves as a 
jurisdictional link. It provides for a potentially far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
From Protest to Recognition 
The effects doctrine was heavily criticized and contested in the first decades following its 
formulation in Alcoa. Yet, it was embraced and regularly relied upon by US courts to find 
jurisdiction in cases challenging foreign anticompetitive agreements affecting the US market. 
In response, a number of states (such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, South Africa, and 
its the most vocal opponent—the UK) attempted to oppose it by means of formal protests, 
expressed in diplomatic notes and, later, submitted directly to US courts in the form of amicus 
curiae briefs. Some states introduced also blocking legislation, aimed at curbing the long-
reach of US competition law, which although hardly ever used in practise, sent a strong 
message.9 
Last instance in which an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine 
by US courts—in itself— was protested against dates back to 1992 and the UK’s amicus curiae 
brief in Hartford Fire.10 This issue is relevant from the international law perspective. A protest 
to be effective, and, in turn, able to prevent recognition of a new customary norm must be 
maintained and actively manifested.11 Since 1992, foreign states’ protests in transnational 
competition cases in the US touching upon the issue of jurisdiction did not challenge the 
effects doctrine as such, but only questioned the permissible limits of jurisdictional assertions 
on that basis. 
Moreover, since its first formulation in Alcoa, many states recognised some form of the 
effects doctrine, that is grounding extraterritorial jurisdiction on domestic harm caused by 
foreign conduct of foreign entities. Some have done so by interpreting the existing provisions 
in a way similar to US courts. That was the case, for example, in the EU12 and seemingly also 
in Japan.13 Other jurisdictions introduced statutory provisions allowing for extraterritoriality 
in such instances. That is the case, for example, in Australia,14 Brazil,15 Canada,16 China,17 
                                                          
9 For discussion and analysis of blocking legislation, including its history, see Martyniszyn, n 4. 
10 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). This conclusion draws from the author’s on-going 
research on foreign states’ amicus curiae briefs submitted in antitrust cases in the US. 
11 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Unilateral Acts of States' in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed), International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 227. 
12 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission 
(Wood Pulp), [1988] ECR 5193; Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-753; Case T‑286/09, 
Intel Corp v. Commission. See further notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
13 Rio Tinto/ BHP Billiton joint venture (2010); Marine Hose cartel (2008); Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) cartel (2009 
and ongoing). 
14 Sec. 5 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
15 Art. 2 of the Law Nº 12.529. 
16 Sec. 46(1) of the Competition Act. 
17 Art. 2 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
Germany,18 Korea,19 India,20 Russia,21 Singapore,22 South Africa,23 and Turkey.24 The very 
broad recognition of the effects doctrine together with the lack of protest against it, at the 
very least, disprove any arguments as to its still controversial nature or contestability under 
public international law. They strongly support the claim that the effects doctrine has already 
emerged as an additional jurisdiction base, alongside the principles of nationality and 
territoriality. 
Extraterritoriality and the Gazprom case 
Morris presupposes the necessity of basing the EU’s jurisdictional assertion over Gazprom on 
the effects of its practices in the EU. He submits that the Gazprom case requires the European 
Commission to rely on the effects doctrine. Moreover, in his view ‘this new vigour [of the 
European Commission] to focus on Gazprom is a brazen step to export EU competition laws 
to Russia or in other words, the application of EU competition laws extraterritorially, in 
particular to companies … outside the European Union [emphasis added].’25 Morris further 
adds that in the Gazprom case ‘the European Union is seeking to extend its competition rules 
beyond the EU borders well into the jurisdiction of another sovereign state’26 and that 
‘attempts by external forces to reign in companies outside its jurisdiction such as Gazprom 
question how far the EU competition rules can go’,27 implying that EU may not have a 
legitimate jurisdictional claim in this case. The initial presupposition regarding 
extraterritoriality is an over-simplification, partly contradicted in the article (since Morris 
acknowledges that ‘Gazprom has significant operations in a number of European 
countries’28). The suggestion that the European Commission is attempting to interfere with 
sovereign rights of the Russian Federation is putting the cart before the horse. 
The question whether, and if so—to what extent the Gazprom case necessitates reliance on 
extraterritoriality is fact-specific. Should Gazprom be found present or conducting business in 
the EU, the location of its seat or its registration outside the EU will carry little significance 
from jurisdictional perspective.29 If Gazprom itself is not present or conducting business in the 
EU, it may be possible to assert jurisdiction over it through its EU’s subsidiaries. If they were 
involved in the investigated practices and if they were controlled by Gazprom (in the sense of 
following its instructions in all material respects), the corporate veil may be pierced and 
                                                          
18 Art. 130(2) of the Act against Restraints of Competition.  
19 Art. 2(2) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
20 Art. 32 of the Competition Act. 
21 Art. 3(2) of the Federal Law №135-FZ on Protection of Competition. 
22 Art. 33(1) of the Competition Act. 
23 Art. 3(1) of the Competition Act. 
24 Art. 2 of the Act on the Protection of Competition. 
25 Morris, n 3, at 605. 
26 Ibid, at 609. 
27 Ibid, at 603. 
28 Ibid, at 608. 
29 See, for example, Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission, [1973] ECR 
0215, 16: ‘The circumstance that [the firm] does not have its registered office within the territory of one of the 
Member States is not sufficient to exclude it from the application of Community law.’ 
Gazprom would fall under the preview of EU law based on the single economic unit doctrine.30 
In such scenarios EU law would apply on the basis of the principles of territoriality or objective 
territoriality.31 
If neither of the above was applicable, it may be possible to assert jurisdiction over Gazprom 
based on the effects which the alleged anticompetitive practices caused in the EU. As 
mentioned above, the EU is one of regimes which recognized such a jurisdictional base. In a 
recent judgment in Intel the General Court clarified that two alternative approaches are 
available in such cases.32 First, laid down in Wood Pulp,33 jurisdiction over foreign entities in 
relation to their foreign conduct can be asserted if that conduct was implemented in the EU 
(the implementation test). In Wood Pulp the agreement at stake was implemented in the EU 
by means of direct sales. In Intel the Court emphasized that a direct sale is only one means of 
implementing a practice. In the case at bar it found that certain restrictions were 
implemented in the EU by a dominant foreign firm by means of incentivising its customers to 
refrain from selling certain products worldwide, including in the EU. The fact that a foreign 
firm does not sell directly to entities in the EU does not remove it from the jurisdictional reach 
of EU law. 34 While the General Court sees the implementation approach as based on the 
principle of territoriality, it has been widely considered a form of the effects doctrine.35 
Second, as established in Gencor,36 jurisdiction over foreign entities can be asserted on the 
basis of the qualified effects of the investigated conduct in the EU (the effects test). If such 
conduct has immediate, substantial and foreseeable effect—actual or potential— in the EU, 
the test is satisfied.37 In the General Court’s view both approaches are justified under public 
international law.38 
Should jurisdiction over Gazprom be asserted on the basis of the effects of its conduct in the 
EU, Russia—at least theoretically— could challenge its legality under international law. This 
question goes back to the issue of recognition of the effects doctrine as a jurisdictional base. 
As discussed above, the international community has— by and large— recognised and 
embraced it. Even Russian competition law provides for extraterritorial assertions on such a 
basis.39 Therefore, it is unlikely that the Russian government would challenge any similarly-
grounded extraterritorial assertion of the EU, in itself. 
                                                          
30 Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission (Dyestuffs), [1972] ECR 619, 133. 
31 See also Alan Riley, 'Commission v. Gazprom: The Antitrust Clash of the Decade?' (CEPS Policy Brief No. 285, 
2012), 11, available at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/7433/pdf. 
32 Intel, n 12, at paras 231-36. 
33 Wood Pulp, n 12. 
34 Intel, n 12, at paras 302-07. 
35 See, for example, Walter van Gerven, 'EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment', 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 451 (1989), at 470-71. 
36 Gencor, n 12. 
37 Intel, n 12, at paras, 240-43, 51-52. 
38 Ibid, at 236. 
39 See n 21. 
In effect, although the European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom practices raises 
various important issues of law and policy, the question of jurisdiction—unlike suggested by 
Morris—is unlikely to become contentious. 
On considerations behind the Russian blocking Order 
In response to the European Commission’s investigation Russian President Putin issued a 
blocking Order aimed at hindering foreign investigations of Russian strategic enterprises.40 In 
particular, the Order requires the investigated firms to seek Russian government’s consent 
prior to (1) providing foreign authorities information in relation to their business operations, 
(2) implementing certain requested remedies, such as introducing changes to pre-existing 
contracts or disposing of certain assets.41 
In his article Morris observed that ‘in reality, the Blocking Order prevents foreign competition 
authorities from investigating Russian companies on the list of strategic companies, and in 
particularly Gazprom’,42 that the Order ‘exclude[s] Gazprom and other strategic companies 
from external investigations (…)’.43 These comments conflate different aspects of 
enforcement that need to be teased out. Whatever legislation the Russian Federation 
adopted, it has little bearing on the capacity of foreign authorities to investigate practices of 
entities within their jurisdiction. One regime cannot enact any sort of immunity or exception 
into laws of another. Hence, foreign investigations are not ‘prevented’ and the firms not 
‘excluded’ from the potential scrutiny. That said, in a particular case—when the investigated 
entities do not obtain a Russian government’s consent, the Order may hinder an investigation 
and negatively affect the possibility of the investigated entities to comply with some of the 
ordered remedies, following a possible decision finding violation. 
Given that the Order was issued long after the European Commission dawn-raided (that is, 
conducted unannounced inspections) a number of companies active on the natural gas 
market in the EU, including some of Gazprom’s subsidiaries, it seems that preventing access 
to information might not have been the principal aim of this measure, at least not in relation 
to this particular investigation. The blocking Order is rather aimed at preventing the 
consequences of the application of the substantive provisions of EU law. It particularly targets 
the implementation of some of the possible remedies.  
Was Gazprom to be found in violation of EU competition law, the Commission could impose 
on it a fine in the amount of up to 10 per cent of its worldwide turnover.44 This could be a 
                                                          
40 Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 on Measures to 
Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign Economic Activities [Указ Президента 
РФ от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285 "О мерах по защите интересов Российской Федерации при 
осуществлении российскими юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической деятельности"]. 
41 The Order has been analysed in detail in Martyniszyn, n 4. 
42 Morris, n 3, at 605. 
43 Ibid, at 608. 
44 Art. 23(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1, 1-25 (2003). 
gigantic fine. In 2013 Gazprom’s worldwide turnover amounted to 5.25 trillion roubles,45 
about 85 billion euro. But the fine itself, however large, is probably not what is most dreaded 
in Russia. The Commission could also ‘unbundle’ Gazprom. Under the Third Energy Package 
legislation a firm cannot both supply energy (be it electricity or gas) and control the 
transmission infrastructure.46 Should Gazprom be found violating EU rules, the Commission 
could impose structural remedies and order Gazprom to ‘sell the pipe’. This would effectively 
dismantle Gazprom’s business model. However unpalatable, the European Commission could 
order it as it has the necessary legal basis. This eventuality might have informed the issuance 
of the blocking Order. The Order potentially makes compliance with any Commission’s 
decision problematic as it requires Gazprom to seek Russian government’s consent prior to, 
for example, selling foreign assets. This is also why it can be seen as an attempt to move the 
Gazprom investigation ‘from the sphere of rule-of-law to the realm of politics’.47   
Conclusions 
The European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom practices in the EU has been pending 
for more than two-and-a-half years. Recently, the EU’s Competition Commissioner stated that 
the Commission ‘can move the case forward in a hopefully relatively short time-span'.48 
Although the Gazprom investigation raises numerous important and often complex issues of 
law and policy, the question of jurisdiction—in itself—is not one of them. It is unlikely to 
become contested and feature prominently in any debates which may follow.  
The question on the role the blocking Order may play in relation to Gazprom’s possible 
compliance, should it be found violating EU rules, remains open. Was the firm unable to 
obtain the Russian government’s consent, it might find itself in a peculiar situation. Legally, it 
is unlikely that the Order could effectively prevent enforcement of a Commission’s decision 
since any possible remedies, including unbundling, concern acts and assets in the territory of 
the EU, not in Russia. 
 
Addendum 
After the above article was submitted to the ECRL, the European Commission, on 22 April 
2015, send the Statement of Objections to Gazprom, formally formulating its concerns in 
relation to Gazprom’s conduct in the EU.49 In particular, the Commission alleges that Gazprom 
                                                          
45 OAO Gazprom IFRS consolidated financial statements 31 December 2013, available at 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/07/271326/gazprom-ifrs-2013-12m-en.pdf. 
46 Directive 09/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for the 
Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing Directive 03/55/EC, OJ 2009 L211/94. 
47 Martyniszyn, n 4, at 112. 
48 Tom Fairless and Stephen Fidler, 'EU Competition Chief Vestager Speaks on Gazprom, Google and Tax', Wall 
Street Journal, 18 February 2015, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/02/18/eu-competition-
chief-vestager-speaks-on-gazprom-google-and-tax/. 
49 European Commission, IP/15/4828, Commission sends Statement of Objections to Gazprom for alleged 
abuse of dominance on Central and Eastern European gas supply markets (22 April 2015), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4828_en.pdf. 
is: (1) hindering cross-border gas sales, (2) charging unfair prices, and (3) leveraging its 
dominance by making supplies conditional upon unrelated commitments from wholesalers. 
In the official communication the Commission pointed out that ‘All companies that operate 
in the European market– no matter if they are European or not – have to play by our EU 
rules.’50 This suggests that having analysed the facts the Commission has, indeed, found 
Gazprom operating in the EU, making this investigation—set in an important geopolitical 
context51— a jurisdictionally uncontroversial case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 See further Marek Martyniszyn, 'The EU’s case against Gazprom is about far more than business', The 
Conversation, 24 April 2015, available at https://theconversation.com/the-eus-case-against-gazprom-is-about-
far-more-than-business-40773. 
